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The deep, historical-roots of Cuban anti-imperialism  
Ernesto Domínguez López and Helen Yaffe 
 
Colonialism, imperialism and anti-imperialism have been decisive in shaping Cuban history for 
hundreds of years. Spain took possession of Cuba as a colony in 1492. For Cubans, building an 
independent nation and mapping out a development path have been fundamental goals that could 
only be achieved through a national project that includes coping with the problem of 
dependence-independence. The presence and vested interests of European colonial powers and 
the emergence of the United States as a regional and global power marked a sequence of 
domination, resistance, revolution and conflict.  
 
The revolution of 1959 marked a rupture. The advent of a revolutionary and socialist Cuba in the 
international system impacted many other processes and projects, and unleashed forces opposed 
to social transformation and national sovereignty for peripheral nations. To study its history is to 
study the history of the clash between hegemonic powers and the national projects in the Third 
World. 
 
(Anti)imperialism remains a central issue since the restoration of diplomatic relations with the 
United States in 2015. The Cuban government has declared that ‘normalisation’ between the 
Cuba and the United States is impossible without the cessation of the US blockade, the end of the 
US occupation of Guantanamo Bay and termination of regime change programmes including 
attempts to foment an internal opposition. The issue of imperialism remains key today, in the 
post-Fidel, President Trump era. This article offers a synthesis of the roots and tenets of Cuban 
anti-imperialism, which is vital for understanding the most recent events in Cuba-US relations 
and Cuba’s foreign policy. The instruments provided by history, political science and political 
economy contribute to a deeper understanding of those complex processes. 
 
Some starting points 
 
The discussion about Cuban anti-imperialism should be based on two pillars. First, an operative 
definition of the concept itself. Put briefly, it means a coherent and conscious opposition to 
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imperialism in general and in its specific forms. Therefore, it is dependent of a second concept: 
imperialism. Lenin’s definition of imperialism describes the core features thus:  
 
(1) the concentration of production and capital has developed to such a high stage 
that it has created monopolies which play a decisive role in economic life; (2) the 
merging of bank capital with industrial capital, and the creation, on the basis of this 
“finance capital”, of a financial oligarchy; (3) the export of capital as distinguished 
from the export of commodities acquires exceptional importance; (4) the formation 
of international monopolist capitalist associations which share the world among 
themselves, and (5) the territorial division of the whole world among the biggest 
capitalist powers is completed.
1
 
  
An extensive discussion and any revisions of this definition is beyond the scope of this article. 
Here, imperialism is defined as the structural domination of peripheral countries and regions by 
core powers through different means. Hence, anti-imperialism encompasses projects, actions and 
policies oriented to revert domination and to build a ‘balanced’ relationship between countries 
and regions based on the promotion of sovereignty.  
 
The second pillar is history. The building of colonial empires in the Americas was crucial to the 
formation of the Atlantic system. The Americas was a key site for the rivalries between 
European powers fighting for the hegemony and the control of global trade networks.
2
 The Gulf 
of Mexico and the Caribbean Basin, in particular, were the centre of multiple conflicts among 
old and new powers and multiple interests.
3
  
 
Thus, the formation and evolution of the Cuban nation have been conditioned by two main 
features. First, the open, or dependent, character of its economy; Cuba’s evolution was partly 
shaped by the type and intensity of its insertion into economic networks connecting the different 
components of the modern World-System.
4
 Second, the geopolitical value of Cuba’s location. 
Particularly from a military and economic perspective, Cuba occupies a key geostrategic 
position.  
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For US elites, control of Cuba was within the goals of their national project. Foundational 
documents of US foreign policy, such as the Monroe Doctrine or Manifest Destiny, reveal two 
essential corollaries: first, US elites asserted the importance of securing a base in the region; 
second, in many ways what is today known as Latin America was not considered ‘external’ to 
the country. The United States’ aspiration meant that Cuba was, by merit of its geostrategic 
position and economic potential, a clear and important target for control. This was considered 
both a necessity for the survival of the American Republic and a right stemming from nature, 
politics and predestination.
5
  
 
Interest in controlling Cuba was reinforced by the existence of a sugar industry that by the 1820s 
had surpassed all competitors.
6
 In parallel, the United States became Cuba’s fundamental trade 
partner. A network of US companies were formed to operate with and on the island. Thousands 
of US citizens established residence in Cuba as investors, traders and corporate representatives, 
increasingly influencing the island’s economy and augmenting Cuba’s importance for US elites.7 
Finally, capital accumulated in the United States sought profitable sources for investment. 
Meanwhile the destruction of property and commerce during the Cuban Independence Wars 
(1868-1878; 1879-1880; and 1895-1898), and the embargo ordered in 1869 by the Spanish 
government for any person associated with the independence struggle, opened space for 
increasing US ownership in Cuba’s economy.8  
 
Hence, the economic relationship between Cuba and the United States was determined by the 
logic of the expansion of US corporate capitalism, or emerging imperialism, and the 
subordination of Cuban industries to its interests. Absorbing Cuban estates and factories at an 
increasing rate was part of the expansion of the vertical integration of productive processes under 
corporate management, a trade mark of US capitalism and a major factor in its transition to a 
hegemonic position.
9
 From the geopolitical perspective, Cuba was in a key location to serve as a 
base to protect New Orleans and Florida, and to control Central America and the interoceanic 
communication vital for the US economy.
10
 Building a power structure in the region was a 
necessary step in the process of transforming the United States into the centre of the World-
System.
11
 Thus US strategic imperatives were to wrestle control of Cuba from Spain and stop 
other European powers from establishing control of the island. The war with Spain and the 
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occupation of Cuba, Puerto Rico, the Philippines and a few Pacific islands were the immediate 
outcomes of that perspective.
12
  
 
The context of Cuban independence was the broad transformation of trans-Atlantic relations via 
independence revolutions, the collapse of imperial powers, state formation and the emergence of 
the United States.
13
 The independence wars of 1868-1898 were largely the outcome of the 
shortcomings of Spanish colonial rule, the accumulation of economic and social crises and the 
rise of independentismo as the hegemonic core of Cuban political ideologies; driving an 
emergent national project to the goal of building a sovereign country.
14
 
 
In 1898, when Spain was losing control of Cuba to the independence fighters, the United States’ 
intervened, effectively preventing the triumph of a social revolution. The US managed the 
construction of a Cuban Republic in which traditional elites, threatened by the radicalism of the 
intended independence, maintained a privileged position.
15
 The Cuban oligarchy was willingly 
incorporated as a subordinated component in a US-centred power structure, becoming in the 
process a key tool in producing and reproducing US hegemony. The Republic of 1902 was 
shaped by mechanisms created to secure US domination over Cuba, clearly embedded in the 
Platt Amendment. This provided the legal framework for the new polity in its relationship with 
United States, and essentially put control of Cuban foreign policy and domestic politics legally in 
US hands.
16
 It also created the framework for the establishment of US naval stations in Cuba.
17
  
 
Domination over the Cuban economy was reinforced through the Trade Reciprocity Treaty of 
1904, which granted Cuban agricultural products exported to the United States a 20% tariff 
discount. In exchange, a long list of US goods received up to 40% tariff discount in Cuba.
18
 In 
1895, the total value of US investments in Cuba was estimated at $95 million.
19
 By the 1920s, 
US companies produced two-thirds of Cuba’s sugar. Other US corporations controlled utilities 
and infrastructure, occasionally in agreements with European companies.
20
 By 1955, US 
investors controlled 90% of the telephone and electric services, 50% of public service railways 
and 40% in raw sugar production.
21
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Washington acted as arbiter and often director of Cuban policy. Military interventions of 
different scales loomed, with US troops entering Cuban territory in 1906 to 1909, 1912, 1917 
and 1923. These conditions generated political and social protest in Cuba, fostered by social 
grievances and growing awareness of the centrality of US imperialism in the country’s situation. 
A series of interlocked processes: the economic and political crisese of the 1930s; the Revolution 
of 1933, a social revolution in Cuba led by a coalition of working classes, intellectuals and 
sectors of the middle classes; and the implementation the Good Neighbour Policy under US 
President Franklin D. Roosevelt, led to the crisis of the oligarchic-imperial model of domination. 
This could only be solved through a structural adjustment. The Cuban military crushed the 1933 
Revolution, inaugurating a series of military coups in 1934, 1936 and 1952, all led by Fulgencio 
Batista. Between this was a brief transition to representative (multiparty) democracy in late 
1930s, crystallised in the Constitution of 1940, in a process that represented the co-optation of a 
large part of the middle classes and the national bourgeoisie.
22
 
 
This was an early version of what became a trade mark of US world-wide hegemony: the neo-
colonial model. United States’ hegemony incorporated European powers and Third-World elites 
as junior partners at different levels. Cuba had all the fundamental features: economic 
dependence, a local military force ready to act against domestic revolutionaries, upper and 
middle classes co-opted and integrated, and a political system designed to reproduce the 
hegemony. The armed forces were the ‘controller of last resort’, in a dynamic model of 
domination based on the alternation of representative democracy and dictatorship in which civil 
and military elites acted as junior partners of the hegemon.
23
 This defined the role of Cuba’s 
constitutional governments (1940-1952) and Batista’s dictatorial rule (1934-1940 and 1952-
1958).  
 
The Cuban Revolution and US reaction  
 
By the early 1950s, national politics had reached a critical point. An anti-corruption movement 
emerged, led by the Orthodox Party (Partido del Pueblo Cubano – Ortodoxo), an amalgam of 
left-wing social democratic leaders and forces, disgruntled former members of the Autenticos 
(the party in government since 1944) and an emerging and a younger generation of radical 
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political activists, including Fidel Castro. The Party looked set to win the 1952 presidential 
election. This election was prevented by Batista’s coup in March 1952.  
 
The revolutionary insurrection of the 1950s was a result of the interaction among a generalised 
opposition to a tyrannical government, the domestic push for broader social transformations and 
the necessity of confronting US domination to achieve these goals. It was the convergence of 
social revolution and the project of full national independence. Anti-Batista forces were 
politically diverse, including: the newly created ‘Movement’, led by Fidel Castro, initially 
established by members of the Orthodox Youth and later renamed Movement 26 of July; the 
Students’ Revolutionary Directorate, formed by college students and young professionals; the 
communist Popular Socialist Party; Autenticos; trade unions and militant workers; and numerous 
independent figures, all with distinct objectives and strategies.  
 
Opposition to Batista was just one factor. Fidel Castro’s famous trial defence speech following 
the failed attack on the Moncada Barracks in July 1953 demonstrates how the struggle against 
the dictatorship was perceived as intrinsically linked to the goal of social revolution.
24
 Castro 
inferred that in order to redistribute land, reduce rents and provide general access to services, 
places and opportunities, a major political change was needed. The struggle required curbing the 
power of Cuban elites and US companies, expropriating at least part of their property, and 
transforming the whole political structure to prevent those sectors from reverting or corrupting 
the revolutionary process.  
 
Clearly that transformation would be detrimental to US interests and those of their junior 
associates in Cuba and could not be achieved within the existing neo-colonial model. A hostile 
reaction to this programme was inevitable, particularly in the 1950s, when social revolution or 
agrarian reform were perceived as synonymous with communism.
25
 Hence, the Revolution of 
1959 was a process that faced only two real alternatives: either it renounced to all fundamental 
changes, beyond expelling Batista, so it would be acceptable to Washington, or it faced the 
hostility of United States. That is, it either operated within the limits imposed by Cuba’s 
subordination to United States, or it broke that dependant relationship and built real sovereignty.  
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The radicalisation of the social and political transformation undertaken by the revolutionary 
government was matched by the increasing intensity of the conflict with United States; new 
policies in Cuba led to hostile responses from Washington. The first major reform in Cuba, the 
Agrarian Reform Act of May 1959, affected primarily the huge concentrations of land in the 
hands of Cuban oligarchs and US companies. These were divided among tenants who became 
small private farmers in the process. The adverse US reaction was the start of an economic 
warfare. Cuba was excluded from all trade with United States, Cuban deposits in US banks were 
frozen, and the island’s ability to trade with other countries was severely limited as a 
consequence of overt pressures by Washington.  
 
This was a traumatic rupture for the Cuban economy. The Cuban government nationalised 
foreign properties in autumn 1960, offering compensation to the owners based on their own 
property valuations for tax purposes. Eisenhower, however, ordered US companies not to 
negotiate a settlement.
26
 Between 1959 and 1961, Cuba was deeply transformed, from neo-
colony to an independent, centrally-planned socialist economy where state ownership and 
management predominated.
27
 Measures taken from 1959 by President Eisenhower were 
systematised in the Executive Order 3447 by President Kennedy in 1962; the full US blockade 
was imposed.   
 
The construction of socialism involved the fundamental transformation of the social structure 
through the nationalisation of the property of the upper classes, and later, the upper-middle 
classes. The process soon expanded to encompass the whole country, in a full-fledged 
redistribution of wealth and ownership. This process, and the political reorganisation of the 
country, generated a surge in emigration, mainly to the United States, by the Cuban elite, and 
principally driven by political motivations and the loss of status.
28
 The early emigrants formed 
the core of the Cuban community in Miami and engaged in multiple plans to overthrow Cuba’s 
new government and assassinate its leaders.
29
  
 
The evolution of Cuba-US relations after 1959 was conditioned by the conflicting forces of 
social, economic and political change in Cuba, and the opposition. The latter consisted of creole 
elites and large sections of the middle classes, increasingly in alliance with the US government. 
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Washington faced the loss of its economic and political control of the island as the revolutionary 
government dismantled pre-existing mechanisms in its search for independent, (and later) 
socialist development in Cuba. Rejecting Cuban attempts to seek a modus vivendi with the 
United States, the Eisenhower administration established a pattern of rejection and hostility – 
despite sporadic secret contacts - followed by subsequent administrations.
30
 From 1959 to 2010s, 
the United States, with its powerful allies in the right-wing exile community based in Miami, 
sought to sabotage or destroy the Revolution and Cuban socialism. This was systematised under 
a two-track policy including: 1) overt aggression and economic strangulation; and 2) attempts to 
foster an internal opposition.  
 
In international terms, Cuba’s Revolution dented the US sphere of influence, weakening the US 
position as a global power. These were the structural geopolitical motivations for opposing 
Cuba’s hard-won independence. The Bay of Pigs (Playa Giron) invasion and multiple military 
invasion plans, programmes of terrorism, sabotage and subversion were part of Washington’s 
reaction.
31
 The process fostered an increasing radicalisation from Cuba’s government and its 
people in the constant search for ways to fight back. Thus, confronting US imperialism became 
an integral part of the Cuban political process and of citizens’ daily lives.  
 
The legacy of Martí in the Revolution of 1959 
 
The early years of the revolution witnessed debate among intellectuals, politicians and 
revolutionaries over the ideological referents and definitions for the new Cuba. A key issue was 
the place of Cuba’s national independence hero, José Martí, who died in 1895 fighting for 
independence from Spain. A writer, journalist and diplomat - he served as consul of Uruguay and 
Paraguay and lived in New York for 15 years - Martí understood the forces driving America 
politics, its main trends and the role of Latin America in the US national project. His perception 
of US interests, and the ways to deal with them, is evident throughout his articles, essays, 
speeches and letters. Particularly eloquent is his essay Nuestra America and the unfinished letter 
to Manuel Mercado written on 18 May 1895, the day before his death in battle. The former 
establishes a distinction between the Anglo-Saxon North America and today’s Latin America, 
which he called ‘Our America’ (Nuestra America), and calls for the unity of the peoples south of 
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the Rio Grande. In Martí’s view, this was the only way to close the door to US domination over 
the continent and preserve the independence of the new nations.
32
 The letter is more explicit: 
Cuban independence was necessary to prevent the US from expanding throughout the Antilles 
and using the islands as springboards to extend its power further south.
33
  
 
Thus, Marti’s revolutionary project included a fundamental geopolitical component based on its 
opposition to the US imperialist project. Anti-imperialism was part of his project for an 
independent Cuba. For a revolution that had Marti’s ideas central to its own program,34 recourse 
to these writings was natural. Cubans on the island got accustomed to TV programmes on Martí, 
el Maestro, his ideals and phrases. These texts were, and remain, included in curricula at all 
educational levels. On the island, Martí’s anti-imperialism is central to his legacy, while the early 
Cuban American community tried to preserve a national hero more amenable to the neo-colonial 
nation.
35
 
 
Martí’s texts introduce a fundamental idea: the path for sovereignty and self-determination 
relates directly to unity among Latin American nations. This is a key perspective when analysing 
Marti’s contribution to the ideological core of Cuba’s revolutionary process. The Revolution was 
perceived as a project that had to go beyond the shores of the island to include a broad regional 
alliance of peoples and political forces to face the might of United States and any other 
imperialist power. The region has a history of subordination to and confrontation with many 
global powers. However, since the emergence of US hegemony in the early twentieth century, 
the ‘neighbour to the North’ became the focus of most of the resistance to peripheral 
subordination (as defined by Chase-Dunn
36
) and revolutions against dependence (as discussed by 
Amir, Arrighi, Frank and Wallerstein
37
). 
 
The Cold War and the Third World 
 
Occurring in the midst of the Cold War, the Cuban Revolution was inevitably interpreted by the 
conflicting powers through the geopolitical lenses of the global conflict. For the United States, 
losing control over the island brought the threat of Soviet involvement. For the USSR, these 
developments created an opportunity to penetrate the US sphere, and to support a revolution 
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leaning towards socialism. In ideological terms, the endogenous forces and trends driving Cuba 
towards socialism were reinforced by the peculiarities of that confrontation. 
 
In that context, Cuban foreign policy paid special attention to the Third World, cultivating 
cooperation and support. In Latin America, the dominant presence of the United States, 
traditionally allied to the national elites, and their concerns about attempts to replicate the Cuban 
revolution in their countries, generated a degree of rejection and hostility towards Havana. In 
August 1960, at a conference of the Organization of American States (OAS) in San Jose, Costa 
Rica, there was open confrontation between Cuba, the United States and many Latin American 
delegations. The final declaration, with the pretext of condemning extra continental interventions 
in the hemisphere, was a clear attack against Cuba’s revolutionary government.38 The OAS 
conference of Punta del Este, Uruguay, in January 1962, voted to expel Cuba from the 
organisation.  
 
Cuba’s response to the events in Costa Rica and Uruguay were condensed in two documents: 
The First and Second Declarations of Havana. The former, presented on 2 September 1960, 
condemned the Declaration of San Jose, rejected US interventionism in the region, announced 
the acceptance of Soviet and Chinese solidarity and declared the necessity for social revolution 
and unity between peoples in the hemisphere as the only route to independence.
39
  
 
The second document, presented on 4 February 1962 is broader. It includes a historical, 
socioeconomic and political analysis of capitalism, colonialism and imperialism, articulated 
around views and theories elaborated from the writings of Karl Marx and Martí.
40
 US hegemony 
in the continent is explained as part of this general evolution, and there is an explicit 
juxtaposition between Cuba’s revolutionary project and the US power structure and policies in 
the region, with a discussion of the achievements of the former and many issues hampering Latin 
American people’s development. The text then declares the duty of revolutionaries, and the will 
of the Cuban people, to fight for revolution in Latin America, in alliance with its people.
41
 
 
These documents were extremely important, especially the Second Declaration, which came 
after Fidel Castro declared the socialist character of the Cuban Revolution in April 1961. They 
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synthesised the ideas promoted by the Cuban revolution, and communicated directly with Latin 
America’s subordinated classes. They contain some of the ideological bases and the prime 
directives of the early foreign policy of the revolutionary government in the region, based in an 
openly anti-imperialist global perspective. 
 
The Missile Crisis in October 1962, was a direct result of this Cold War entanglement and 
conflict. 
It was ended by an agreement from the USSR to withdraw missiles and warheads from Cuba in 
exchange for the United States removing missiles from Turkey. Cuba’s demands for resolving 
the crisis were ignored. The settlement between Moscow and Washington, without the 
participation of the Cuban government and without any tangible benefit for Cuba beyond a 
verbal promise by US President John F. Kennedy not to invade the island, was a major 
disappointment for Havana and chilled relations with Moscow, which had acted in its own 
geopolitical interests. Even while Cuba and the USSR went on to expand their ideological, 
political and economic partnership, Cuba had concluded that, ultimately, it depended on itself. 
The Cuban leadership determined to pursue its own foreign policy.  
 
Against the backdrop of the Cold War, the 1950s to the 1970s was a period of decolonisation in 
Africa, Asia and the Caribbean, so the future of the Third World was in play. In 1955, the 
Conference of Bandung had signalled the birth of a project to build a broad association of nations 
in the Global South – as it is now called - to promote autonomous development, without 
participating in the military alliances that encompassed the main Western powers and the Eastern 
European countries.  
 
In 1961, also in Bandung, the Asia-Africa Solidarity Committee had its first conference; Cuba 
sent a delegation. The conferences that followed, with the participation of Latin American 
observers, insisted on the need to expand the organisation to Latin America, with the goal of 
consolidating a global anti-imperialist movement. The Cuban government extended an invitation 
to celebrate in Havana a first official gathering of the anti-imperialist movements from the three 
continents. This conference took place in January 1966, and was the origin of the Organisation 
for the Solidarity with the Peoples of Asia, Africa and Latin America (OSPAAL). The final 
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declaration of the first Tricontinental Conference – as the event was called - expressed the 
necessity of consolidating the alliance of organisations, movements, and political forces from the 
Third World.
42
 This reflected the development of Cuban foreign policy and anti-imperialism as 
systemic approaches to a set of broader goals; promoting a global struggle against diverse forms 
of dependence, imperialism, colonialism, neo-colonialism. In other words, it served as a 
confirmation that Cuban anti-imperialism was not limited to the confrontation with the United 
States, but included a global revolutionary project. It included the application of another idea 
stemming from Martí: ‘Homeland is Humanity’ (‘Patria es Humanidad’). It proposed a broader 
alliance than that of the working class promoted by Marx and therefore better suited for the 
characteristics of the Global South. 
 
Cuba became a major force in that global struggle, sending combatants to and assisting liberation 
movements in Latin America, Africa and Asia; providing medical and technical assistance to 
recently liberated countries; and sending soldiers to Africa to support national revolutionary 
governments.
43
 It connected national liberation movements and newly emerged independent 
governments struggling against neo-colonialism and foreign aggression. A key figure in Cuba’s 
endeavours in the early years was Ernesto ‘Che’ Guevara, who’s anti-imperialism evolved on his 
travels throughout Latin America and led him to take up arms in Cuba, the Congo and in Bolivia, 
from where he sent a Message to the Tricontinental, calling for the creation of ‘one, two, many 
Vietnams.’44 The history of Cuban foreign policy, from the Revolution of 1959 to the late 1980s, 
sees the application of ideals defined in the early stages of the revolutionary process.   
 
Between centuries: from unipolarism to rapprochement 
 
With the disappearance of the Soviet Union and the Eastern European socialist bloc between 
1989 and 1991, the international system that had endured since the Second World War collapsed. 
The bipolarity of Cold War was temporarily replaced by a unipolar order dominated by the 
United States. This represented an earthquake for national movements and governments in the 
Third World. For Cuba, it represented even more: the loss of its principal economic partners - the 
source of up to 85% of its international trade and investments - and political allies.  
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The US administrations of George H. W. Bush (1989-1993) and William J. Clinton (1993-2001) 
responded by redefining US strategic priorities; their traditional sources of legitimacy had to be 
revisited and adapted. Cuba was seen as the last domino; its fall was viewed as inevitable in 
Washington and Miami. To aid that process the system of sanctions was reinforced through the 
Torricelli Act of 1992 and the Helms-Burton Act of 1996.
45
 The Clinton administration 
introduced the strategy of ‘people to people’ programmes, turning ‘normal’ Cuban citizens into 
targets for influence by US ideas/ideals transmitted through direct contact with US visitors who 
required a licence to visit the island.  
 
The Cuban revolution’s survival was under threat. A deep economic crisis brought a 35% 
contraction of GDP between 1989 and 1993 and unleashed a wide-spread social crisis stemming 
from the deterioration of living standards, the reduction of available social services, and the 
sudden disappearance of opportunities for personal development.
46
 The result was growing 
tension in Cuba’s political fabric; a function of increasing difficulties in the reproduction of 
legitimacy, given reduced ability to provide for citizens, and the loss of referents for the socialist 
project. Analysts outside of Cuba tended to assume that Cuba would face a major transformation 
and probably a ‘transition to democracy’; a term associated with Eastern Europe following the 
collapse of socialism and essentially meaning the restoration of capitalism.
47
 Discussions 
concerned how to facilitate that process in Cuba. Few could imagine the continuity of socialism 
in the Caribbean country. 
 
The emergency economic programme introduced between 1990 and 1993, ‘significantly changed 
the economic paradigm in that, without renouncing the socialist essence of the economy, [it] 
opened up considerable space for market mechanisms designed to reactivate production and 
services’.48 Small businesses were promoted and the economy opened up to foreign direct 
investment (FDI) in specific areas, with emphasis on sectors with a significant potential: tourism, 
the biopharmaceutical industry and nickel production. The strategy combined the search for 
means to survive with the creation of pillars for a transition towards a tertiary, ‘knowledge-
based’ economy. It meant attempting to diversify the Cuban economy by adapting some of the 
most modern trends in the world economy to the specific conditions and the goals of the Cuban 
14 
 
model; reaping the benefits of the Revolution’s welfare-based development strategy, including 
its investments in health and education.
49
   
 
Cuba’s international projection was also on the table, including, once more, the relationship with 
United States. Havana was advised to undertake realistic and pragmatic policies, making positive 
gestures to Washington that could stimulate conciliatory responses.
50
 But such proposals fell on 
death ears. Instead, the diversification of international relations was Cuba’s key strategy, seeking 
peaceful co-existence with governments around the world, focussing especially on Latin 
America. This posed a serious question about the continuity of its commitment to social 
revolution and sovereignty building. The immediate answer is that the island developed a more 
nuanced set of policies, in which diplomacy, intergovernmental cooperation and political 
mechanisms were preferred over more traditional ways to deal with core-periphery relations, 
hegemony and domestic antagonisms. Havana became an active promoter of regional integration 
as the only viable path to sustainable development outside the control of global powers. In place 
of the military combat missions of the past, cooperation and para-diplomacy gained importance, 
especially medical assistance and (medical) education for Third World countries. These 
programmes had existed for decades, but now increased massively in scope and centrality.
51
  
 
In the aftermath of 9/11, under the George W. Bush administration (2001 to 2009), the United 
States adopted a more overtly unilateral foreign policy based on a preferential use of hard power 
and so-called pre-emptive action under the label of the ‘War on Terror’.52 The new US national 
security strategy was articulated around a deeply neoconservative worldview.
53
 The United 
States’ Cuba policy followed the same guidelines; reinforcing existing sanctions, expanding 
support for domestic and Miami-based opposition and creating a structure dedicated to promote 
and manage a transition in Cuba that should bring it back to capitalism under US control. This 
was formalised by the 2004 plan produced by the Commission for Assistance to a Free Cuba, 
created in 2003. The plan was updated in 2006, largely in response to domestic and international 
criticism, although both were based on the same ideas.
54
  
 
Against the odds, the Cuban revolutionary project survived.
55
 By the dawn of the 21
st
 century the 
government found new allies in the wave of left-wing governments and movements that swept 
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the Western hemisphere. Latin American populations were increasingly the beneficiaries of 
Cuban development aid, and Cuba reaped the benefits in increased support from their 
governments and increased integration and influence in regional institutions. The most relevant 
cases were Venezuela with the Bolivarian process led by Hugo Chavez, followed by Bolivia’s 
first indigenous President, Evo Morales and the Movement to Socialism and then Ecuador, 
where the Citizen Revolution led by Rafael Correa introduced a number of significant social 
changes and a new foreign policy. These were the pillars of a new network of regional alliances 
oriented to promote the breaking up of the traditional dependence from United States, thus 
building a new form of anti-imperialist policy.  
 
The new regional integration projects which emerged specifically rejected US influence. Cuba 
was an active member in most of them, thus becoming again pivotal as an example of alternative 
development in the search for sovereignty in the Third World. Without reducing its close ties 
with Africa and Asia, Cuba’s Latin American policy gave the island a renewed importance in 
international affairs. The growing complexity of the international system generated by the re-
emergence of global players like China and Russia, countries with which Cuba had good and 
improving relations, made these changes in the New World even more significant. 
 
The impact of the financial and economic crisis of 2008 led the new administration of President 
Barack Obama (2009-2017) to re-evaluate the international situation and US capacity, and 
reformulate US foreign policy accordingly. Founded on the idea of smart power,
56
 the new 
approach adjusted US national security strategy and connected policies.
57
 It combined hard 
power with soft power according to specific circumstances and scenarios, thus adopting a more 
flexible set of tools for a more pragmatic view on the ways to preserve US hegemony.  
 
On 17 December 2014, the Presidents of the United States and Cuba astonished the world with 
their simultaneous, televised announcements of an extraordinary change in the political 
relationship between their countries. Following 18 months of secret negotiations, Barack Obama 
and Raul Castro officially started the process of restoring diplomatic relations. In summer 2015, 
embassies were reopened after 54 years. A series of Bilateral Commissions began negotiations 
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about multiple issues of conflict and mutual interest, aiming towards a second and far more 
complex and difficult level: an eventual ‘normalisation’ of the relationship.  
 
Research into the decision made by both governments to initiate rapprochement is ongoing, 
hence evidence remains incomplete and conclusions partial. However, some ideas can be 
formulated. For Washington, it was important to eliminate an irritant in its relations with Latin 
America. The continent was increasingly assertive in demanding the end of the US blockade and 
a normalisation of relations. Under Obama, the US moved to reconstruct its weakened control 
over the region, which is fundamental for reinforcing its global clout. The US also seeks 
mechanisms to exercise influence within Cuba itself, not least in anticipation of the departure the 
‘historic generation’ – the leaders and veterans of the Cuban Revolution. The new policy should 
be understood within the general framework of a necessary adjustment to an increasingly 
multipolar and complex international system; part of the project to build, reinforce and protect 
the US sphere of influence in the hemisphere.
58
 
 
There were also domestic reasons. The balance of forces managing Washington’s Cuba policy 
had shifted at least to the point in which, given favourable conditions, a policy change could be 
implemented. The Cuban American community, especially in Miami, had been altering, due to 
the inflow of new immigrants from the 1990s and natural generational changes.
59
 Despite the 
hardened attitudes of the most powerful and traditional Cuban American political organisations 
and most Cuban American politicians, these changes were slowly transforming the political 
cleavages, in a process that will reduce the political influence of the community’s elites and 
simultaneously increase the support for policies more favourable to the engagement with Cuba.
60
 
More research is required to study, for example, the role of entrepreneurial groups and local 
economic interests, or bargaining among political groups within Congress and the political 
parties. 
 
For Cuba, rapprochement was necessary to reduce its greatest external threat and remove the 
paramount obstacle to national development - the US blockade. Cuba had entered a process of 
‘updating’ the Cuban economy and accessing foreign capital, markets and technology was a 
fundamental goal in this process. The direct impact of rapprochement, in the form of agreements, 
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investment, commerce or tourism, and the indirect impact of the ‘demonstration effect’, which 
encouraged capital inflows, commerce, tourism and cooperation with other countries and 
companies (competitors of the US), were considered beneficial for the Cuban economy. Also, the 
possibility of reducing, and ideally ending, US support for internal opposition and subversion 
was an incentive for Cuba.  
 
The actual scope and effects of rapprochement in Cuba remain uncertain. It is especially difficult 
to determine its impact given that it merged with the process of domestic transformations 
unfolding in Cuba. Most visible of those are the economic reforms which diversify the 
ownership and management structure, expanding non-state-owned economic actors, or 
businesses. Cuban state-owned enterprises still account for the bulk of economic activity and 
employment, but they face many challenges stemming from the opening of the market and 
rapprochement with the United States.
61
 
 
The election of Donald J. Trump as president of the United States in late 2016 introduced new 
variables. Immediately the rapprochement process stagnated. In June 2017, Trump announced a 
presidential memorandum introducing new restrictions in the relationship.
62
 However, the 
rhetoric of the announcement was more dramatic than the effective changes; Obama’s Cuba 
policy was not entirely scrapped. Nonetheless, the actual impact was also broader, denting the 
business environment and the expectations of (potential) investors and trade partners. Eight 
months into the Trump administration, we can say that its foreign policy has been erratic; 
employing aggressive language and hard power instruments. Constant changes to the presidential 
staff, the composition of the cabinet and the conflictive relations among political actors within 
the administration, the Congress and their entourage, introduce further layers of uncertainty, 
which has come to be a salient characteristic of US foreign policy since early 2017.  
 
What will be the final impact of the Trump administration on Cuba? It is difficult to predict, but 
the following is clear: Obama’s rapprochement has been abandoned. The change is limited by 
the complexities of US politics and the imperatives of the international system. From pulling out 
of multilateral agreements to the alienation of allies, Trump has generated increasingly negative 
reactions around the planet. Some countries that have positive relations with Cuba: Iran, North 
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Korea, Russia and, especially, Venezuela have received additional sanctions and were threatened 
by US Congress, or President Trump and his aids and associates. Consequently, it is even less 
probable that Cuba will change its political positions. Perhaps the most explicit expression of 
contemporary continuity is the public declarations of support for the Venezuelan government of 
Maduro and the Venezuelan people against Washington’s threats and sanctions, during the worst 
crisis of the Bolivarian Revolution. 
 
Questions about the future of US-Cuban relations abound. Most relevant is the definition of the 
term ‘normal’ in that context. Within the framework of history, ideologies, geopolitics, economic 
interests and power relations, the US definition of normal would arguably be Cuba’s 
reintegration into the US-centred power structure in the Western hemisphere. This concept 
emerges clearly from Obama’s own speech. For Cuba, ‘normalisation’ cannot mean a return to 
that historical norm. It must entail a new paradigm which Raul Castro refers to as ‘peaceful 
coexistence’ between two sovereign nations that negotiate as equals. The Cuban government has 
declared that ‘normalisation’ is impossible without the cessation of the US blockade, the end of 
the US occupation of Guantanamo Bay and termination of regime change programmes.  
 
One of the many questions which arises with the process of rapprochement is whether Cuba will 
sacrifice its anti-imperialism and its foreign policy to advance normalisation with United States. 
In particular, there are concerns about the future of the alliance with Venezuela and other left-
leaning governments in Latin America, as well as its strategic relations with other international 
actors, like Russia or China. Given the complex history of Cuba-US bilateral relations, the depth 
of Cuban involvement in world-wide international politics, and the degree of understandable 
distrust between the two parties, it is too soon for any major changes to have emerged.  
 
As yet, the tenets of Cuban foreign policy, embedded since the 1990s, remain unchanged and 
their effects are visible in the faltering progress of the process of ‘normalisation’. For example, 
in summer 2017, nearly 50,000 Cuban medical professionals were serving in 63 countries in 
Latin America, Asia and Africa.
63
 Nearly half of the total were in Venezuela. They remained 
during the political crisis and despite the threat of violence by the government’s opposition and 
of military intervention by the United States. Intergovernmental agreements saw more than 
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15,000 foreign students from 28 countries training as medical doctors, dentists, nurses and 
specialists in health technology. The figure includes over 100 American students from poor 
communities, as part of agreements with local authorities, specific congresspersons and social 
and religious organisations. This fact highlights an interesting point: The Cuban version of anti-
imperialism and solidarity includes the subordinated classes and sectors of core countries, even 
the United States. 
 
There are additional points to consider. First, president Obama’s rapprochement speech openly 
explained that the policy constituted a change of means, but not the goal of US strategy.
64
 
Indeed, Washington spent $5 million on Cuban ‘democracy programmes’ in 2015 and a further 
$15 million was planned for 2017 fiscal year.
65
 Clearly, the US rapprochement process did not 
signify real acceptance of the legitimacy of the Cuban government, nor an effort to establish 
peaceful coexistence between two different political, economic and social regimes.  
 
Second, as explained above, among the motivations for the change in US policy, is the fact that 
Cuba ‘punched above its weight’ in international affairs; its influence derived from its 
independent and consistent foreign policy based on anti-imperialist principles established early 
on in the Revolution. Thus, even from a pragmatic perspective, to make concessions in this field 
would weaken Cuba’s position and therefore diminish the incentive for normalisation among 
decision-makers in Washington. That is to say, it would be a self-damaging policy. 
 
Third, the ideological framework of Cuba’s foreign relations remains essentially the same, with 
variations generated by the evolving circumstances and the weight of history. The definitions and 
goals stemming from the core ideas articulating the policies are still based on the legacy of 
Martí, as interpreted by the Revolution. Furthermore, there is understanding of the structural 
restrictions imposed by the hierarchy within the world-system for peripheral countries and 
regions, and thus the improbability of Cuba achieving sustainable development by accepting a 
subordinated position within it. 
 
Conclusion  
 
20 
 
The origins of the Cuban nation are deeply rooted in a complex entanglement of interests and 
projects of imperial powers, domestic elites, middle and subordinated classes. Conflict, 
interdependence, bargaining, have channelled those interests and shaped Cuba’s history. These 
factors have determined the existence of and underlying clash between the Cuban national 
project and the aspirations of different powers in different moments to control the strategically-
located island. The United States eventually emerged as the most important of those powers in its 
path towards hegemony over the entire World-System. The same process created a deep 
connection between social change and sovereignty in Cuba to such an extent that they cannot be 
separated. 
 
Since the Revolution of 1959, Cuba’s development was articulated around four interlocked axes. 
First, a profound transformation of social, economic and political structures, which was at the 
core of the emerging national project. Second, ending the traditional dependence on the United 
States, and dealing with the immediate hostile reaction from Washington. Third, the global 
conflict – the ‘Cold War’ – a polarised world with multiple international strategic political 
alliances. Fourth, an active policy supporting liberation movements and opposing imperialism 
internationally. 
 
What emerged post-1959 was a coherent anti-imperialist domestic and foreign policy, expressed 
in an active involvement in revolutionary struggles all around the Third World. This was based 
on ideological postulates stemming from an original combination of Marxist theories with an 
interpretation of Latin American and Cuban histories and ideas advanced by Martí. It was part of 
the redefinition of the idea of Cuba resulting from the rupture generated by the Revolution of 
1959 and the collapse and emigration of the elites. 
 
The fall of socialism in Eastern Europe and the USSR and the crisis it triggered led to a redesign 
of the strategies implemented by the Cuban government, domestically and internationally, to 
cope with the biggest challenge: survival. This included sweeping reforms in the country and a 
resizing of its foreign policy. Anti-imperialism and solidarity with the Third World remained 
central, but the emphasis was on peaceful cooperation and co-existence. The political processes 
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in Latin America in the early 2000s opened space for a more active participation in projects of 
regional integration and created new networks of strategic alliances.  
 
The rapprochement announced in December 2014 represents a new stage in an extremely 
complex and long-running relationship between Cuba and United States; a conflict that has 
implications for North-South relations. It is the most recent expression of the underlying 
contradiction. In a broader sense, it is the contradiction between the subordinated Third World 
and imperialist centres of power. Cuban history continues to be conditioned by relations with 
Washington, and more broadly with the dominant powers in the world system. The major 
conflict still to be resolved is similar to that which has presided over history.  
 
The election of Trump and his foreign policy has added uncertainty, but change was limited and 
imprecise in his first eight months in office. Doubts and expectations loom as all actors and 
institutions seek to adjust without reliable information. This has fostered significant international 
discontent with US policies and the increasing potential for open conflict world-wide and in the 
hemisphere. 
 
Anti-imperialism continues to drive Cuba’s foreign policy. An anti-imperialism tempered by the 
realities of the 21
st
 century, thus expressed through multi-level cooperation with numerous Third 
World countries, and political opposition to actions by global powers, mainly the United States, 
that are considered harmful for the sovereignty of nations in the global south. The final outcome 
of the reforms and the impact of Obama’s engagement and Trump policies are yet to be 
determined. 
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